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I. INTRODUCTION
This Note will examine the Supreme Court's opinions in Price
Waterhousev. Hopkins' and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,2
and will argue for their use in extending Title VII protection to victims of
sexual orientation discrimination. To date, very few courts have utilized
both opinions to protect homosexual or perceived homosexual victims of
same-sex sexual harassment.' Prior to Oncale, some courts refused to
recognize the claims of victims of same-sex sexual harassment at all.4 In
Oncale, the Court seemingly settled the controversy by holding that Title
VII addresses all claims of sexual harassment, including same-sex sexual
harassment.5 Part II will discuss the root of the lower-court conflict by
examining the historic treatment of sex discrimination under Title VII. Part
III will discuss the Supreme Court's evolution of Title VII protection by
examining Price Waterhouse's expanded interpretation of sex
discrimination under Title VII. Part III will further detail the evolution of
sex discrimination jurisprudence to include sexual harassment and,
ultimately, Oncale 'sallowance of same-sex sexual harassment claims. Part
IV will examine Oncale"s effect on the lower-court controversy by
reviewing same-sex sexual harassment decisions by the Ninth Circuit
before and after the Supreme Court's ruling in Oncale. Part V will
examine the Court's position on sexual harassment against homosexual
victims by analyzing Oncale in light of prior Supreme Court precedent
regarding legislation deemed discriminatory. The Court's history of
inconsistency concerning the treatment of homosexuals has made lower
courts wary of misinterpreting all the Court did not say. Further, Part V
will highlight these deficiencies of Oncale and explain how they have
essentially exacerbated the conflict at the lower-court level. Lastly, Part VI
will argue for Title VII protection based upon sexual orientation
discrimination-protection that Oncale, read in conjunction with Price
Waterhouse, potentially grants to homosexual victims of same-sex sexual
harassment.

1. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
2. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
3. See generally,e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir.
2001) (distinguishing sex discrimination from sexual orientation discrimination); Spearman v. Ford
Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 2000) (advancing Congressional intent argument that
"because of... sex" was meant to protect only against discrimination because of biologicalsex and
not sexual orientation); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252,259-61 (1 st Cir.
1999) (rejecting plaintiff's argument on appeal that discrimination was because of sex, when he had
argued in district court that the discrimination was because of sexual orientation).
4. See, e.g., Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill.
1988).
5. See generally Oncale, 523 U.S. 75.
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II. ASKING THE 'GENDER QUESTION': 6 THE INCONSISTENCY OF
TITLE VII'S PROMISE OF SEX EQUALITY

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19647 protects employees in both
the public and private arenas from discrimination "because of... race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."' Because the protected class "sex"
was added at the last minute by the opposition in an attempt to defeat the
bill,9 there was very little Congressional debate about the scope of its
inherent protection. As such, subsequent federal court references to
"legislative intent" as indicative of the breadth of the "because of... sex"
coverage have been illusory. ' ° Because the "plain language" doctrine of
statutory interpretation likewise provides little guidance," much of the
statute's sex discrimination protection ultimately has been left to the
Supreme Court to determine.
What is known of Congress's intent in drafting the "because of... sex"
language is that it was not limited to targeting discrimination solely
because of sex. 2 Despite the express refusal of Congress to impose such
a restraint on the words of the statute, courts initially did just that.
Corresponding with pleas of "equality feminists," who were among the
first to utilize Title VII's remedy for sex discrimination, 3 the protection

6. See Judith Resnik, Gender Bias:From Classesto Courts, 45 STAN. L. REv. 2195, 2197
(1993). "Ask[ing] the 'gender question' was coined by Judith Resnik in her work detailing gender
bias in the federal court system. See id
7. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
8. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). The statute provides, in relevant part, that "it shall
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ... ." Id
9. See Anthony E. Varona & Jeffrey M. Monks, En/GenderingEquality: Seeking Relief
UnderTitle VIIAgainstEmployment DiscriminationBased on Sexual Orientation,7 WM. &MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 67, 70-71 (2000) (citing Robert Stevens Miller, Jr., Sex Discriminationand Title
VI1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MIN. L. REV. 877, 880 (1967)).
10. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 572 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated by 523
U.S. 1001 (1998) (cautioning against reading "too much into a legislative history that amounts to
little more than a last-ditch effort to scuttle the entire statute").
11. The plain language doctrine provides that "words used in statutes are to be given their
ordinary meaning." DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 330 n.3 (9th Cir. 1979)
(quoting EEOC Dec. No. 76-75 (1976), Emp. Prac. Guide (CCII) P 6495, at 4266). Unfortunately,
there is no "ordinary meaning" of the word sex, and the debate over which meaning Title VII was
intended to address lies at the heart of the sex-orientation-as-sex-discrimination conflict
12. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,241 n.7 (1989) (discussing Congress's
specific rejection of"an amendment that would have placed the word 'solely' in front of the words
'because of' in Title VII (citing 110 CONG. REc. 2728, 13837 (1964)).
13. See Mary Anne C. Case, DisaggregatingGenderfromSex andSexual Orientation:The
Effeminate Man in the Law andFeministJurisprudence,105 YALE L.J. 1, 9-10 (1995) (discussing
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inherent in "because of... sex" was initially interpreted narrowly to
combat the existing inequities between men and women in the
workplace. 14 This traditional brand of sex discrimination analysis,
involving the scenario where a female victim is denied employment
opportunities given to similarly-situated males, targeted disparate
treatment because of the female victim's biological sex. 5 As courts
reasoned, such discrimination, because it encompassed the very evil the
legislature was "intending" to remedy, was readily amenable to Title VII
protection. 16
The persistence of this traditional vantage of sex discrimination
analysis in the courts produced a wealth of case law notorious among
feminists for its recurrent failure to distinguish sex from gender. 7 "Sex"
denotes male and female biological and anatomical differences while
"gender" describes the societal influences that distinguish the way men
and women are expected to act.' Though federal courts use the terms

how Ruth Bader Ginsburg, currently a United States Supreme Court Justice, often represented male
plaintiffs, and reasoning that "laws based on stereotypical assumptions about the sexes" were
damaging to both men and women, regardless of the sex of the plaintift).
14. That traditional view was only recently rejected. In 1983, the Supreme Court finally
affirmed the view that Title VII applied to both men and women. See Newport News Shipbuilding
& Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 685 (1983).
15. f5ee, e.g., Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198(7th Cir. 1971)(holding
that imposition of"no marriage" rule for female but not male flight attendants was impermissible
disparate treatment under Title VII).
16. See Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. I11. 1988) ("The
discrimination Congress was concerned about when it enacted Title VII is one stemming from an
imbalance ofpower and an abuse ofthat imbalance by the powerful which results in discrimination
against a discrete and vulnerable group.").
17. This failure is quite evident when examining the courts' analysis of"because of... sex"
in transgender cases. See, e.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984)
(finding that Title VII did not apply to a pre-operative transsexual woman because the term 'sex'
meant no more than biological male or biological female); Underwood v. Archer Mgmt. Servs.,
Inc., 857 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D.D.C. 1994) (defining sex as "[t]he state of being male or female and
conditions associated therewith" (alterations in original) (citing D.C. Mun. Regs., tit. 4, § 599)).
See also Case, supranote 13, at 2; Katherine M. Franke, The CentralMistake ofSex Discrimination
Law: The DisaggregationofSex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1995).
18. See Paul A. Davis, What is "Sex"? Heterosexual-Male-on-Heterosexual-MaleSexual
HarassmentActions After Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 1341,
1374-75 (1998), describing scholar Daniel Ortiz's characterization of the distinction between sex
and gender:
Think of sex and gender as descriptions. Both concepts serve to mark out and
describe a group of people, but they mark out and describe the group very
differently. Sex offers a biological description of people, whereas gender offers
a purely cultural one. Sex marks off men and women in a biological way and does
so very well. Gender, on the other hand, does not clearly delineate between these
biological categories. Gender's description ofwomen, for example, may not fit all
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"sex" and "gender" interchangeably, 9 only biological sex-based
discrimination motivated by the victim's status as male orfemale has been
customarily cited as grounds for a cause of action under Title VIL2°
Sex-based equality law, however, operates under an assumption of
gender differentiation between the sexes.2 Sex discrimination cases that
form the current doctrine actually demonstrate the difficulty in segregating
sex from gender.22 For example, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB.,23 the
Court held unconstitutional the use of peremptory challenges based upon
the "gender" of the juror, stating that"[t]he message it sends to all those in
the courtroom, and all those who may later learn of the discriminatory act,

biological women and may, in fact, fit some men. Gender, however, does possess
some advantages. Despite its biological inaccuracies, it provides a much thicker
and informative description of how many men and women live.
Id, (citing Daniel R. Ortiz, CreatingControversy: EssentialismandConstructivism andthe Politics
ofGay Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1833, 1844 (1993) (citation omitted)).
19. Justice Scalia even chastised the Supreme Court for its failure to distinguish sex from
gender:
Throughout this opinion, I shall refer to the issue as sex discrimination rather than
(as the Court does) gender discrimination. The word "gender" has acquired the
new and useful connotation of cultural or attitudinal characteristics (as opposed
to physical characteristics) distinctive to the sexes. That is to say, gender is to sex
as feminine is to female and masculine is to male. The present case does not
involve peremptory strikes exercised on the basis of femininity or masculinity (as
far as it appears, effeminate men did not survive the prosecution's peremptories).
The case involves, therefore, sex discrimination plain and simple.
J.E.B. v. Alabamaexrel.T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 157 n.l (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority's holding that sex-based peremptory strikes involved 'gender' discrimination).
20. Katherine M. Franke highlighted the error of the courts' interpretation of Title VII:
To the extent that the wrong of sex discrimination is limited to conduct or
treatment which would not have occurred but for the plaintiff s biological sex,
antidiscrimination law strives for too little. Notwithstanding an occasional gesture
to the contrary, courts have not interpreted the wrong of sex discrimination to
reach rules and policies that reinforce masculinity as the authentic and natural
exercise of male agency and femininity as the authentic and natural exercise of
female agency.
Franke, supranote 17, at 4.
21. As the court confirmed inMichaelM.v. SuperiorCourtofSonomaCounty, 450 U.S. 464,
469 (1981), the "Court has consistently upheld statutes where the gender classification is not
invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain
circumstances."
22. See Case, supra note 13, at 2 (discussing, critically, the Court's failure to distinguish
between "sex" and "gender" in case law).
23. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
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is that certain individuals, for no reason other than gender [i.e., sex], are
presumed unqualified by state actors to decide important questions upon
which reasonable persons could disagree."' 4 Though the Court invalidated
the practice on the grounds that it distinguished males from females, the
bases of such sex-based discrimination are societal assumptions and
stereotypes about the behaviors associated with each sex- i.e., gender.
Therefore, sex-based discrimination under Title VII has also protected
against discrimination because ofgender. To the extent that sex and gender
are intertwined, the cases and legislation tend to protect both, but only in
concert.2 ' However, since all males do not "act masculine" and all females
do not "act feminine," the law that results from a limited application of
Title VII's "because of... sex" protection strives for too little.
The failure of the courts to recognize gender as both distinct from and
inherent in discrimination "because of... sex" has limited Title VII's
ability to remedy contemporary forms of sex discrimination.26 Indeed, the
courts' power to define sex has traditionally determined entitlement to a
cause of action under Title VII's prohibition of discrimination "because
of . . . sex." While "sex" and "gender" are necessarily intertwined,
differentiating them allows for greater protection, by analogy, for more
groups than those currently protected from discriminatory actions based
upon a narrow interpretation of sex.27 Perhaps the most pervasive example

24. Id. at 142 (emphasis added).
25. See cases cited supra note 3; see also Franke, supra note 17, at 2 ("[]n every way that
matters, sex bears an epiphenomenal relationship to gender; that is, under close examination, almost
every claim with regard to sexual identity or sex discrimination can be shown to be grounded in
normative gender rules and roles.").
26. Katherine M. Franke theorized on the problem with sex discrimination jurisprudence:
In the name ofavoiding "the grossest discrimination," that is, "treating things that
are different as though they were exactly alike," sexual equality jurisprudence has
uncritically accepted the validity of biological sexual differences. By accepting
these biological differences, equalityjurisprudence reifies as foundational fact that
which is really an effect of normative gender ideology. This jurisprudential error
not only produces obvious absurdities at the margin of gendered identity, but it
also explains why sex discrimination laws have been relatively ineffective in
dismantling profound sex segregation.
Franke, supra note 17, at 2 (quoting Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971)).
27. For example, some courts have refused to recognize claims when the discrimination at
issue is against a pre-operative transsexual. See, e.g., Ulanev. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081,
1085 (7th Cir. 1984). Strailey v. Happy Times Nursery Sch., reported as part of DeSantis v. Pac.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 331-32 (9th Cir. 1979) (regarding an effeminate man); WislockiGoin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1375, 1379 (7th Cir. 1987) (refusing to recognize Title VII claim
of woman, accused of being too feminine, who was terminated for wearing her hair down and
wearing excessive makeup). These claims all have in common discrimination based upon failure
to conform in gender to the acceptable norms of the respective work environments.
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of the interpretational deficiency, which has resulted in the largest class of
individuals being denied recovery under Title VII,28 has been the persistent
refusal of lower courts to recognize that protection from discrimination
"because of... sex" includes protection from discrimination because of
sexual orientation.
III.

THE SUPREME COURT'S EXPANSION OF TITLE VII PROTECTION

A. Gender Equals Sex: Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court provided
homosexual victims with the ammunition to argue for protection from
sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII 29 Though the meaning
of "sex" under Title VII was not at issue,30 the Court recognized an
expanded definition of "sex" that, for the first time, segregated sex from
gender.3 While the Court did not appear to notice the novelty of its
decision under the facts of the case, Price Waterhouse has since been
recognized
by scholars and hailed by feminists for its valid use ofthe word
"gender"32 and its determination that discrimination based upon gender is
actionable as sex discriminationunder Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964."
In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins, a senior manager at the defendant
accounting firm, alleged sex discrimination after being denied
partnership.34 During the evaluation process, Hopkins was noted positively
as "an outstanding professional," with a "deft touch," and "strong

28. See Theodore A. Schroeder, Fablesofthe Deconstruction:The PracticalFailures
ofGay
andLesbian Theory in the Realm ofEmployment Discrimination,6 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y
&L. 333, 335-36 (1998).
29. See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
30. The issue on appeal was whether the plaintiff or the defendant carried the burden of
proving causation under Title VII. Id at 237-38.
31. See id. at 240-42.
32. See, e.g., Case, supra note 13, at 36-37 (describing Price Waterhouse as "breaking new
ground"). The use of "gender" instead of "sex" was valid because gender discrimination, based
upon Hopkins' failure to "act like her sex" was at issue. See Price Waterhouse,490 U.S. at 234-35.
The Court, of course, did not recognize the distinction between sex and gender, and, as has become
typical, used the words "gender" and "sex" interchangeably throughout the opinion. See generally
id. (discussed in depth infra).
33. See, e.g., Marvin Dunson, III, Sex, Gender, and Transgender: The Presentand Future
of Employment DiscriminationLaw, 22 BERKELEY J. EM. & LAB. L. 465, 476 ("After Price
Waterhouse, it seems clear that the term 'sex,' as used in Title VII, encompasses more than just
anatomy."). See also Case, supra note 13, at 49-50 (suggesting that Price Waterhouse overrules
similar claims brought by gender-nonconforming men).
34. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231-32.
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character, independence and integrity."35 She was also complimented for
her success in obtaining a twenty-five million dollar contract with the
Department of State.36 The bulk of the evaluation comments, however,
were signs of the partners' reactions to Hopkins as a woman. 3 They
focused not on her work ethic, but her abrasive personality and weak
"interpersonal skills."38 She was termed "macho," noted as
"overcompensat[ing] for being a woman," and advised to take "a course
at charm school."39 Most notable were the comments of the partner who
told her, in confidence, that to improve her chances for partnership she
should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear makeup, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."4 The
crux of Hopkins' claim was not that she was refused promotion because
she was a woman, but that she was denied partnership because she was a
woman who did not act like a woman."
While the Court never explicitly distinguished the discrimination it
found as based upon sex or gender,42 and in fact used the terms
interchangeably throughout the opinion,43 it did recognize the distinct
35. Id. at 234.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 236-37.
38. Id. at 234-35.
39. Id. at 235.
40. Id.
41. See id.at251.
42. The Court actually combined elements of sex and gender in making its analysis, treating
sex stereotyping as acting on the basis ofgender in refusing a particular sex opportunities enjoyed
by the other sex. Id.at 250. It did not distinguish individually-targeted discrimination based upon
gender from the class-based discriminatory effect of sex-based discrimination. See id. Instead, it
showed how gender discrimination can have elements of both. See id. The plaintiff was
discriminated against as a woman (sex) who did not conform to societal norms of womanhood
(gender):
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, we
mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its
reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one of those reasons would
be that the applicant... was a woman. In the specific context of sex stereotyping,
an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive,
or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.
Id. (citation omitted). The facts of Price Waterhouse suggest that it was this unique case of "sex
plus gender" that motivated the defendant's discrimination. See id. at 231-37.
43. See, e.g., id.
at 248 (referring to Title VII exception if employer asserts that "gender" is
a bona fide occupational qualification before discussing the Equal Pay Act, where employer must
show that different wages to women are not "sex linked"). The court referred to the partners'
comments as "sex"-as opposed to "gender"-based. Id. at 258. Further, the Court discussed the
impropriety of employment considerations of "gender" and "sex" interchangeably. Id. at 284-85
(Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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nature of sexual stereotyping as a form of "sex discrimination" actionable
under Title VII:
In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who
acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be
aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of
gender ....
An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but
whose positions require this trait places women in [a] catch
22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job
if they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind."
The defendant in Price Waterhouse did not insinuate that women as a class
were unqualified for partnership, but rather that women must conform to
stereotyped notions of how women should behave in order to be reviewed
favorably." To advance in a "man's world," women must act like women.
The distinction shows precisely how discrimination based upon gender
necessarily discriminates because of sex. The Court recognized as much
and found such gender discrimination prohibited as sex discrimination
under Title VII.46 Thus, the Court widened the realm of proscribed
discrimination by acknowledging that gender-stereotyped comments that
prove determinative in making employment decisions provide sufficient
evidence
of discriminatory intent to support a cause of action under Title
47
VII.
B. The Effeminate Man in Light of Price Waterhouse
Paradoxically, sex discrimination analysis under Title VII has produced
unwittingly hypocritical and inherently inequitable jurisprudence. Most
illogically, the courts' interpretation of "because of... sex" has inhibited
some male victims of discrimination from proving a cause of action. A
woman who "acts like a man" is unreservedly protected, in recognition of
the unjust "Catch-22" of an ambitious woman working in a "man's
world,"4' while men who "act like women" are labeled homosexual, 49 a
class repeatedly not protected under Title VII. Is the incompatible
treatment of men and women duplicitous or are there true differences
between the sexes that warrant the divergence? Why is gender

44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 250-51.
See id. at 234-36.
Id. at 251.
See id.

48. See id.
49. See Strailey v. Happy Times Nursery Sch., reportedas partofDeSantis v. Pac. Tel. &
Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 328, 331-32 (9th Cir. 1979).
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nonconformity considered "because of... sex" only when a woman is
victimized?
One commentator shed light on the root of the problem, "In many cases,
biology operates as the excuse or cover for social practices that hierarchize
individual members ofthe social category 'man' over individual members
of the social category 'woman."' 5 Since Title VII has traditionally been
used to remedy that hierarchical inequity, courts are generally more
cognizant of the inequities of women in the existing stratified social
structure. A woman's failure to gender conform, once in a predominantly
male arena, is seen as merely a struggle to adapt to a new environment-a
"catch 22.""51 The cause of a man's gender nonconformity cannot be
justified on similar grounds. He is seen as nonconforming; she is seen as
struggling to conform. The court applying Title VII will more readily
understand the plight of a gender-nonconforming female victim of
discrimination but fail to empathize with similarly-situated males, who are
seen as having a completely different social "dysfunction"--presumably
based upon sexual orientation, and wholly distinct from gender.5 2 Since
discrimination based upon sexual orientation is usually due, in large part,
to society's refusal to accept the behaviors of those who do not behave as
members of their sex are expected to behave, it is similarly discrimination
based upon gender nonconformity. 3
Because the Court in Price Waterhouse never recognized the novelty
of its opinion, lower courts have not recognized Price Waterhouse as
implicitly overruling case law that had been decided from the traditional,
biologically-determinative vantage of sex discrimination jurisprudence.54
In particular, courts have not grasped the opinion's utility in finally
recognizing claims of sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII. As
a result, the effeminate man's claim of discrimination "because of... sex"
is rarely recognized.5
C. Oncale Recognizes Men as Equal to Women in Sex
DiscriminationJurisprudence
For years following the enactment of Title VII, women were

50. Franke, supra note 17, at 3.
51. See Price Waterhouse,490 U.S. at 251.
52. See generally Case, supra note 13, at 54-57.
53. See id. at 77; see also Varona & Monks, supra note 9, at 67 ("Discrimination against
lesbians and gay men often is motivated.., by how [they are perceived as] violat[ing] societal sex
and gender norms.... ").
54. Discussed infra Part IV.A.
55. See Case,supranote 13, at 49 ("Those post-Hopkins cases that have indirectly considered
claims of discrimination against effeminacy in men.., have resulted in decisions against the male
plaintiffs.").
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continually the focal point of any important precedent-setting
interpretation of "because of. . . sex."56 Only recently, in Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., did the Court have men in mind when
it made its ruling. Though the Court remained gender neutral in its
analysis, finding only that same-sex sexual harassment claims are
actionable under Title VII," the primary victims impaired by lower court
prohibitions on such claims had been men. 8 Hence, Oncale provided the
prime opportunity to extend the rationale of Price Waterhouse to the
paradigmatic same-sex sexual harassment claim: the male harasser
discriminating against the male victim because of his gender
nonconformity. 9
1. The Background for Oncale: Sexual Harassment as Sex
Discrimination: Meritorand Harris
The notion that sexual harassment that creates a hostile work
environment is actionable sex discrimination, while commonplace today,
is a rather recent development in sex discrimination law. Only twelve
years before Oncale officially sanctioned sexual harassment claims
brought by victims of the same sex as their harassers, 0 the Supreme Court
in Meritor Savings Bank; FSB v. Vinson 6' recognized "hostile [work]
environment" sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination under
Title VII 2 In Meritor, the Court outlined the requirements for a prima
facie sexual harassment case: the plaintiff must show that he or she 1) is
a member of a protected class; 2) received unwelcome sexual harassment,
3) based on sex; 4) that affected a term or condition of employment, and
5) the employer knew or should have known about the harassment and did
not take steps to correct it.63 Expanding on that analysis in Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc.,' Justice Ginsburg, in a concurring opinion,
established what would become an important litmus test for the presence
of sexual harassment: "[tihe critical issue.., is whether members of one
sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to
56.
extended
57.
58.
59.
60.

See supra notes 14 and 15 and accompanying text. Title VII protection was not officially
to men until 1983.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
See Varona & Monks, supra note 9, at 104-05.
See id.
See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82.

61. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
62. Id. at 73. The Court rationalized the expansion of sexual harassment claims: if sexual
harassment becomes so "severe or pervasive" that it alters the terms or conditions of employment,
it is just as much an "arbitrary barrier to sexual equality [in] the workplace" as is quid pro quo
harassment or disparate treatment. Id. at 67 (quotation marks omitted).
63. Id. at 64-66.
64. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
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which members of the other sex are not exposed."6 Oncale's adoption of
that same factor would later prove to inhibit same-sex sexual harassment
claims.66
2. Same-Sex Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination:
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.
While lower courts have readily recognized opposite-sex sexual
harassment claims, the same courts "have taken a bewildering variety of
stances"6 7 on the availability of Title VII to victims of same-sex sexual
harassment. Reasoning that Congress's intent in combating sex
discrimination in Title VII was to right the imbalance of power that results
when women, through sexual harassment, are subordinated to men, the
Northern District of Illinois declared that Congress did not intend to
extend Title VII to same-sex sexual harassment claims.6 Others, assuming
that sexual harassment is only motivated by the harasser's sexual desire for
the victim, recognized same-sex sexual harassment claims only if the
harasser was homosexual.69 Still others, finding no statutory justification
for a contrary conclusion, ruled that sexual harassment is always
actionable, regardless of the harasser's sex.70
In Oncale, a unanimous Supreme Court settled the question of whether
Title VII applies to same-sex discrimination and established an even more
flexible interpretation of the statute.7 Joseph Oncale, a male employee,
brought a Title VII action against his former employer, supervisors, and
co-workers alleging sexual harassment.7 He reported being humiliated in
sexually suggestive ways, being physically assaulted, and being threatened
with rape.73 Oncale also alleged that he was called names "suggesting
homosexuality."'7 4 When complaints to management proved ineffective,
Oncale, fearing forcible rape, voluntarily left the job.75 The district court,

65. Id. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
66. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). Discussed infra, Part
V.B.
67. Id. at 79.
68. See Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1455-56 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (finding no
"imbalance of power" since the plaintiff worked in an all-male environment).
69. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195-96 (4th
Cir. 1996).
70. Doe v. Belleville, 119 F.3d 563,570 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated by 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
71. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79-80.
72. Id. at 77.
73. Id. The Court, "in the interest of both brevity and dignity," was intentionally vague as to
the harassment alleged. Id.
74. Id. The Court did not mention or place relevance on whether Oncale was homosexual.
See generally id.
75. Id.
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relying on Fifth Circuit precedent, concluded that Title VII did not create
a cause of action for harassment against a male by his male co-workers.76
In a six-page opinion, the simplicity of which undermined the
complexity of the lower court controversy, Justice Scalia, writing for a
unanimous court, determined that "because of... sex" should be read
dynamically to "go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably
comparable evils... [and] extend to sexual harassment of any kind that
meets the statutory requirements." 77 The Court likened the Fifth Circuit's
refusal to extend Title VII's protection to same-sex sexual harassment
claims to the "related context of racial discrimination... [where the Court
had] rejected any conclusive presumption that an employer will not
discriminate against other members of his own race.,M The Court found
"no justification in the statutory language or . . . precedents for a
categorical rule
excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage
79
of Title VII.,,
Because same-sex sexual harassment, if not motivated by sexual desire,
is more difficult to detect than opposite-sex sexual harassment, the Court
provided "evidentiary route[s]" to assist plaintiffs in pleading a claim.8"
Besides producing evidence of the harasser's homosexuality, a plaintiff
could prove the harasser's general hostility towards others of the same sex
or offer evidence proving the disparate treatment of each sex in the
workplace.8 The critical inquiry, the Court reminded, is whether the
offensive
conduct "constitute[s] 'discriminaftion] ... because of...
82
sex.,,
IV. THE IMPACT OF ONCALE: NINTH CIRCUIT EXAMPLE
While the Court's opinion in Oncale was short and seemingly to the
point, its brevity ultimately created more confusion than clarification at the
appellate level. Since Oncale did not discuss the sexual orientation
discrimination that lay at the heart of the lower-court controversy, courts
continue to treat its presence within a same-sex sexual harassment case
inconsistently.83 The Ninth Circuit's treatment of same-sex sexual

76. Id.
77. Id. at 79-80 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 78. "Because of the many facets of human motivation, it would be unwise to
presume as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will not discriminate against
other members of their group." Id. (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977)).
79. Id. at 80.
80. See id. at 80-81.

81. Id.
82. Id. at 81 (second alteration in original).
83. Indeed, the Second Circuit in Simonton v. Runyon, 225 F.3d 122, 125-26 (2000),
interpreted Oncale'ssilence on sexual orientation as implicity leaving prior prohibitions on such
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harassment claims under Title VII both before and after Oncale
exemplifies the confusion that still exists at the lower-court level.
A. Pre-Oncale:Strailey, DeSantis, and Lundin-Inequitable
Application of "Because of Sex" Protection
Prior to Price Waterhouse and Oncale, the Ninth Circuit failed to
recognize that discrimination against males because of effeminacy is
gender discrimination. In DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph
Co.,84 homosexual men and women brought three separate claims alleging
employment discrimination under Title VII because of their
homosexuality." The claims were consolidated, but each had a distinctive
basis of alleged discrimination.86
In Strailey v. Happy Times Nursery School, Inc.,"7 the plaintiff, a male,
was fired after two years of employment as a nursery school teacher.8 The
alleged basis of his termination was because he wore a small gold earring
to school. 9 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
rejected his claim because it "lack[ed] jurisdiction over claims of
discrimination based on sexual orientation."9 The district court likewise
found no cause of action under Title VII. 9 '
In DeSantis,DeSantis, Boyle, and Simard, all males, claimed that the
defendant discriminated against them in making hiring and supervisory
decisions.92 DeSantis alleged that he was refused employment because of
his sexual orientation.9' Boyle and Simard alleged continual sexual
harassment by coworkers, which eventually induced them to quit their
jobs.94 As did the plaintiff in Strailey, the plaintiffs resorted to Title VII
relief when the EEOC refused to recognize their charges.95 Also as in
Strailey,the district court dismissed their complaints. 96
97
Lundin and
In Lundin v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
Buckley, both females, worked as operators with defendant telephone

discrimination intact.
84. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
85. Id. at 328.
86. Id. at 328-29. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals. Id. at 328.
87. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
88. Id. at 328.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Desantis, 608 F.2d at 328.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id at 328-29.
96. Id. at 329.
97. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
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company.9" They filed suit under Title VII, alleging discriminatory
treatment and eventual termination because of their lesbian relationship.99
Following a clear pattern of treatment for claims citing sexual orientation
as the10basis
of the Title VII complaint, the district court dismissed their
0
claim.
The Ninth Circuit did not examine the individual facts of each
plaintiff's claim, but generally discussed Title VII's preclusion of all such
claims.'' The plaintiffs' argument, that Congress intended Title VII's
"because of ...sex" to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
preference,"0 2 had no precedential support in applicable case law. 3 The
Ninth Circuit, concluding that "Title VII's prohibition of 'sex'
discrimination applies only to discrimination on the basis of gender and
should not be judicially extended to include sexual preference such as
homosexuality,'' °4 affirmed the district court on all claims." 5
The Ninth Circuit's position in DeSantis bespeaks its narrow view of
homosexuality as a "conduct," distinguished by homosexual practices. In
fact, it viewed plaintiffs' gender-based arguments as fruitless attempts to
"'bootstrap' ... protection for homosexuals" onto Title VII. 116 The Court
did not even bother to examine the discriminating conduct at issue to
determine if gender role expectations provided impetus for the
discrimination. In Strailey,for example, the Ninth Circuit, characterizing
the basis of the discrimination as sexual orientation,'0 7 failed to note the
obvious gender-based motivations underlying the discrimination. The
98. Id. at 329.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 33 1. The Court viewed the alleged discrimination in all the suits as based solely on
sexual orientation. Id.
102. Id. at 329. Plaintiffs rationalized their argument by concluding "that discrimination
against homosexuals disproportionately effects [sic] men and that this disproportionate impact and
correlation between discrimination on the basis of sexual preference and discrimination on the basis
of 'sex' requires that sexual preference be considered a subcategory of the 'sex' category of Title
VII." Id.
103. See Id In fact, in denying plaintiffs' Title VII claims, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on
its reasoning in Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977), decided two
years earlier, that "Congress had only the traditional notions of 'sex' in mind" when constructing
Title VII. Id.(quoting Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 556 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977) (refusing
to apply Title VII to discrimination against transsexuals)).
104. Desantis, 608 F.2d at 329-30 (footnote omitted).
105. Id at 333. Prior to Oncale and Price Waterhouse, other appellate courts also refused to
allow effeminate men a cause of action under Title VII. See, e.g., Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
569 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1978).
106. See Desantis, 608 F.2d at 330.
107. Id. at 328. The claim became "homosexual" in nature because the plaintiff admitted he
was homosexual. See id.His alleged basis for discriminatory treatment, however, was that he wore
an earring. See id
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Court equated discrimination because of effeminacy with discrimination
because of homosexuality;'
it did not recognize the "gender"
discrimination inherent in both classifications. The plaintiff in Strailey
represented Ann Hopkins' male alter ego; but the discrimination Strailey
endured was attributed to his homosexuality rather than gender
stereotypes." 9 Since Price Waterhouse essentially righted the wrong of
Strailey under easily comparable facts, the two cases, viewed in
conjunction, give the lower courts permission to look beyond the
plaintif'shomosexual conduct to the harasser'sgender-based motivations
for discrimination."'
B. Post-Oncale:Schwenk, Rene, andNichols-nconsistant
Application of "Because of Sex" Protection
The Ninth Circuit relied on Price Waterhouse and Oncale in reversing
its position against transsexual plaintiffs in Title VII actions. 1 ' In Schwenk
v. Hartford,"2 Schwenk, a pre-operative transsexual prison inmate,
brought a claim against a prison guard alleging sexual assault under the
now defunct Gender Motivated Violence Act (GMVA). "' The Court relied
on Title VII analysis to determine the meaning of the statute's similar
"because of ... sex" coverage, and concluded that the prison guard's
alleged "actions were motivated, at least in part, by Schwenk's ...
assumption of a feminine rather than a typically masculine appearance or
demeanor."' 4 Relying on Price Waterhouse 's interpretation that "becuase
of... sex" under Title VII encompasses both sex and gender,"' the Court
reversed its prior stance" 6 and concluded that "[d]iscrimination because

108. Id.at331-32.
109. See id.
110. Strailey's claim, for example, with discrimination clearly predicated upon Strailey's
possession of "effeminate" characteristics, in opposition to the "male" behavior expected of him,
would likely survive a motion to dismiss after Price Waterhouse.
I11. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1200-02 (9th Cir. 2000). In Holloway v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 556 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977), the court had held that Title VII did not apply to
transsexuals. Id. at 1201.
112. 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
113. Id. at 1192. The Supreme Court found this part of the Violence Against Women Act, the
act under which the Gender Motivated Violence Act (GMVA) was subsumed, unconstitutional in
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
114. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202.
115. Id. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989)).
116. See id. at 1201. Prior to Price Waterhouse, the court had denied pre-operative male-tofemale transsexuals protection under Title VII, because, as anatomical males, they did not conform
to society's standards of masculinity. Id. Therefore, discrimination against them was based upon
gender, and not sex. See id. Price Waterhouse sanctioned both gender and sex discrimination
protection under Title VII. Id. at 1201-02.
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one fails to act in the way expected of a man or woman is forbidden under
Title VII,"' 117 and thus forbidden under the GMVA." 8
One year later, in Rene v. MGM GrandHotel, Inc.,"9 the Ninth Circuit
denied Title VII recovery to an openly gay man who was harassed by his
male coworkers on a daily basis. 2 Though Rene endured sexually
simulating harassment similar to that endured by Oncale,"' the Court
relied on Oncale to deny Rene's claim."' Rene asserted that Oncale
implicitly held that sexual orientation discrimination is protected under
Title VII,'23 but the Ninth Circuit distinguished Oncale's holding as
narrower than that, explaining that it represented only the Supreme Court's
bare acknowledgment that same-sex sexual harassment was entitled to
Title VII protection. 2 Because the Court concluded that Rene was
harassed because of his sexual orientation and not his sex, his Title VII
claim failed. 2 The Court did not mention Price Waterhouse.
Though the Ninth Circuit in Rene chose to distinguish sexual
orientation from "sex," its subsequent holding in Nichols v. Azteca
Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.'26 reveals the inconsistency and inherent
unfairness of such a strict approach. In Nichols, Sanchez, a male
employee, alleged harassment by his male coworkers.127 He was subjected
to daily insults, called "she" and "faggot," and mocked for acting "like a
woman."'128 Though the facts of Nichols were similar to other same-sex
sexual harassment claims dismissed by the Ninth Circuit,129 Sanchez did
not allege discrimination because of his sexual orientation. Rather, in
pleading his claim, Sanchez asserted that he was harassed because he was
effeminate and "did not meet [his male co-workers'] views of a male
stereotype."' 30 The clever wording of Sanchez's claim forced the Ninth
Circuit to confront the impact of Price Waterhouse on Oncale when same-

117. Id. at 1202.
118. See id.
119. 243 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2001).
120. Id. at 1207.
121. See id. Like the plaintiff in Oncale, Rene was grabbed in the crotch, poked in the anus,
forced to look at naked men having sex, caressed, whistled at, blown kisses at,and called sexuallysuggestive names. Id.
122. See id. at 1208-09.
123. Id. at 1208.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1210.
126. 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
127. Id. at 869, 870.
128. Id.
129. Rene, for example, can be distinguished only because the sexual harassment at issue was
both physical and verbal. See Rene, 243 F.3d at 1207. Rene, too, was mocked, called effeminate
names, and treated like a woman. Id.
130. Nichols, 256 F.3d at 869.
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sex sexual harassment is alleged.' Indeed, the Court relied on both
decisions in concluding that Sanchez's discrimination was actionable
under Title VII.' 32 Agreeing with Sanchez's contention that "the holding
of Price Waterhouse applies with equal force to a man who is
' the Court overruled
discriminated against for acting too feminine,"133
DeSantis' proscription of such claims and granted Sanchez protection
under Title VII. 134 The Court made no mention of the words "sexual
orientation" or "homosexuality."
The Supreme Court's liberal "because of. . , sex" interpretation in
Price Waterhouse and somewhat conflicting restrictiveexpansion of Title
VII protection in Oncale3 have produced strange results at th6 lower
court level.136 Plaintiffs, to withstand a motion to dismiss, are forced to
remain silent about their sexual orientation, and instead speak of their
discrimination in veiled terms in order to comport with the courts'
confused understanding of "because of. . . sex" protection after the
Supreme Court decisions. Consequently, entitlement to Title VII
protection ultimately depends upon spurious factors such as whether the
37
particular words and actions used by harassers are sufficiently "sexual,"'
whether the victim is an "effeminate" or "masculine" homosexual, 3 and
whether the victim pleads his claim in language sanctioned by the

131. See id. at 874.
132. Id. at 877.
133. Id. at 874.
134. Id. at 875.
135. The holding expanded Title VII to allow for same-sex sexual harassment claims, but, as
discussed in Part V, limited its holding in dicta. Lower courts have chosen to rely on the dicta in
denying claims involving sexual orientation. See infra note 136.
136. Compare, e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257,261 (3d Cir. 2001)
(distinguishing sex discrimination from sexual orientation discrimination), with Simonton v.
Runyon, 225 F.3d 122, 126, 127 (2nd Cir. 2000) (denying claim based upon sexual orientation
discrimination, but acknowledging that the same claim might be allowed by a "failure to conform
to gender norms" approach); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 2000)
(advancing Congressional intent argument that "because of... sex" was meant to protect only
against discrimination because of biological sex and not sexual orientation); Higgins v. New
Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259-61 (1 st Cir. 1999) (rejecting plaintiff's argument
on appeal that discrimination was because of sex, when he had argued in district court that the
discrimination was because of sexual orientation); Doe v. City of Bellville, 119 F.3d 563, 582-83
(7th Cir. 1997), vacatedby 523 U.S. 1001 (1998) (finding same-sex sexual harassment predicated
on the victim's failure to conform to accepted gender norms).
137. See, e.g., Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1085 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that harassers used
sexually explicit, vulgar insults to express their anger over work-related conflicts, and the insults
were not related to appellant's sex).
138. See, e.g., Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864,870 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding
employees' references to appellant as "she" and "her" and comments that he carried his tray like
a woman to be "because of... sex" as required for Title VII).
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courts' 3 9 -language that, the cases indicate, must include no mention of
homosexuality.140 Ironically, the sexual harassment protection the Court
characterized as a flexible interpretation of Title VII,"' has, in the
aftermath of Oncale, become more restrictive than Oncale 'sbroad holding
would suggest. Understanding the lower courts' confused response to
Oncale requires understanding Oncale itself. To do so, it is necessary to
look beyond the six-page opinion and examine the meaning of all that the
Court failed to address.
V. MAKING SENSE OF ONCALE

Though gay rights activists hailed Oncale's allowance of same-sex
142
sexual harassment claims under Title VII as a victory for homosexuals,
Oncale stopped far short of recognizing sexual orientation discrimination
as actionable "because of... sex" discrimination under the statute. Since
the Supreme Court failed to mention the special nature of same-sex sexual
harassment when the victim is homosexual, it did not indicate whether
such discrimination entails discrimination "because of... sex." Therefore,
the essential meaning of Oncale, in terms of homosexual protection under
Title VII, must be gathered from what the case, read in light of previous
Supreme Court precedent, did not say.
A. Oncale in Light ofSupreme CourtPrecedent
While Supreme Court precedent on sexual orientation involves the
status of homosexuals under the Constitution (and not Congressional
statute),' the scope of much of Title VII's sex discrimination prohibition
has come not from legislative intent, but from the Supreme Court. 44 The
trend in the Court's analysis shows a hesitance to take a clear position on
the precise status of homosexuals under either the Constitution or Title
VII. Therefore, what can be ascertained about the Court's stance on the
application of federal antidiscrimination legislation to homosexuals must

139. See, e.g., Higgins, 194 F.3d at 261 (1st Cir. 1999) (dismissing plaintiff's argument that
discrimination was because of gender stereotyping since appellant did not mention that basis in the
district court or lower court).
140. See id.

141. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
142. See, e.g., Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Supreme Court Says Same-Sex
Harassment Illegal 4 (March 4, 1998), at http//www.aclu.org/newsln030498b.html.
143. For example, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996), dealt with the Equal Protection
Clause as applied to homosexuals, and Bowers v. Hardwick,478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986), dealt with
the Due Process Clause as applied to rights for homosexuals. Both cases are discussed infranotes
145-74 and accompanying text.
144. See supranotes 9 and 10 and accompanying text.
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come from its analysis of state discriminatory legislation against
homosexuals.
As many critics have noted, any protection for homosexuals granted by
the Supreme Court will be of limited significance as long as Bowers v.
Hardwick4 ' remains good law.146 In Bowers, the Supreme Court found no
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.'47 The plaintiff in
Bowers attempted to rely on the fundamental right of privacy espoused in
Griswoldv. Connecticut4 8 and its progeny.'49 The Court, however, took
great pains to distinguish the homosexual right of privacy from that of
traditionally protected heterosexual rights. 5 ° The case can be read as
explicitly condoning differential treatment of homosexuals, and hence,
discrimination based upon sexual orientation.'
Some scholars, perhaps the same optimists who see Oncale as a victory
for gay rights, cite Romer v. Evans'52 as an implicit rejection of Bowers,
at least in the equal protection arena.'53 Others recognize that Romer
stopped far short of overruling Bowers.15 4 The expansive holding of the
case essentially asserted no more than the basic meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause: all people deserve equal protection under the laws.
145. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
146. See, e.g., John P. Safranek, M.D. & Stephen J. Safranek, Can Homosexual Equal
ProtectionClaims Withstand the ImplicationsofBowers v. Hardwick?, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 703,
704 (2001) ("argu[ing] that federal homosexual equal protection rights cannot be sustained until
the United States Supreme Cotirt rejects Bowers v. Hardwickroot and branch.").
147. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195-96.
148. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing, originally, a "right of privacy" by finding the
Constitution protected the rights of married people to use contraception).
149. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189-90. Griswold'sprogeny includes Eisenstadtv. Baird,405 U.S.
438 (1972) (extending Griswoldto nonmarital couples); Stanley v. Georgia,394 U.S. 557 (1969)
(recognizing individual right ofprivacy within one's household); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113(1973)
(recognizing the right of a woman to choose whether or not to continue a pregnancy). Id.
150. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91. Finding that "none of the rights announced in those cases
bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of
sodomy," the Court immediately declared the inapplicability of those cases to homosexuals. Id.
While the right of privacy would presumably protect the right of heterosexuals to engage in sexual
activity behind closed doors, the right of homosexual sodomy, the Court found, is not "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977)).
151. See generally id.
152. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
153. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Foreward:Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV.
4, 62 (1996) ("The underlying judgment in Romer must be that, at least for purposes of the Equal
Protection Clause, it is no longer legitimate to discriminate against homosexuals as a class simply
because the state wants to discourage homosexuality or homosexual behavior.").
154. See The Supreme Court: 1995 Term-LeadingCases, 110 HARV.L.REv. 155,163 (1996)
("The Court founded its decision on a rule that legislation making it more burdensome for a single
group of citizens to seek the government's protection is a per se denial of equal protection of the
laws.").
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First, Romer was decided under mere rational basis review. 55 To be
fair, it was not a difficult decision. Romer dealt with a Colorado citizen's
attempt, via constitutional amendment, to ban all protective
measures-executive, judicial, or legislative-enacted for the "benefit" of
homosexuals.'56 The Court found the amendment, "withdraw[ing] from
homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries
caused by discrimination, and... forbid[ding] reinstatement of [those]
laws and practices,"' 57 clearly irrational and discriminatory. 58 Instead of
taking the opportunity to provide strengthened protection for homosexuals,
however, the Court spoke in such broad and generic terms 59 that the case
ultimately stands as only a slight affirmation for gay rights. Rational basis
review for discriminatory legislation against homosexuals, though
adequate to overturn the discriminatory legislation in Romer, ultimately
awards homosexuals very little constitutional protection.
Secondly, the case did not distinguish the discrimination as against
homosexuals, a class deserving of heightened protection per se, but as
against citizens, worthy of humane treatment, 6 Though citing the Civil
Rights Cases'6 ' and Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,'62
opinions that acknowledged protected status based upon race, the Court
failed to justify the lesser review granted legislation that classifies based
upon sexual orientation. Since the Court missed the prime opportunity to
treat homosexuals as a unique class, worthy of heightened protection, their
precise status with the Court remains uncertain.
Romer is perhaps most disappointing for the implications to be taken
from what it did not say. Instead of completely discrediting the interests
asserted by Colorado in such an amendment, 63 the Court failed to address

155.
156.
157.
158.

Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
Id. at 623-24.
Id. at 627.
Id. at 635-36.

159. For instance, the Court spoke mainly about the irrational discriminatory nature of the
legislation and not the group it discriminated against. "Central both to the idea of the rule of law
and to our own Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and
each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance." Id. As Justice Scalia

noted in his dissent, "the Court's opinion [was] long on emotive utterance and... short on relevant
legal citation." Id at 639 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160. Id at 631 (assuming that no suspect class was at issue without analyzing homosexuals
to see if they fit the criteria for protected status).
161. Id at 628 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,25,27 (1883)).
162. "IT]he Constitution 'neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."' Id. at 623
(quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
163. Colorado's interests included: "respect for other citizens' freedom of association, and in
particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or religious objections to

homosexuality... [and] its interest in conserving resources to fight discrimination against other
groups." Id. at 635.
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them, suggesting implicitly that they may be valid interests under a
different legislative scheme. This silence, combined with the Court's
failure to distinguish constitutionally acceptable discrimination against
homosexuals (Bowers' criminalization of homosexual sodomy) from the
constitutionally unacceptable discrimination at issue, makes Romer
mediocre authority on gay rights issues. As Justice Scalia lamented, the
majority did not even mention Bowers.' 4
What does the Bowers/Romer debate have to do with the inherent
meaning of Oncale? Perhaps most telling about Oncale's silence on
protection for homosexual victims under Title VII is that its author, Justice
Scalia, condoned Bowers in his "vigorously dissent[ing]" opinion in
Romer. 6' Thus, the arguably little protection for homosexuals the Supreme
Court granted through Romer was expressly rebuked by Justice Scalia.
While the majority in Romer approved antidiscrimination laws
protecting homosexuals, Justice Scalia saw such legislation as granting
"preferential treatment" for a politically powerful group. 66 He explained
the "problem" with allowing homosexual advocates to use the political
process to enact antidiscrimination legislation: "[t]he problem.., is that,
because those who engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in
disproportionate numbers in certain communities... and, of course, care
about homosexual-rights issues much more ardently than the public at
large, they possess political power much greater than their number....,, 6 7
Justice Scalia listed the repercussions of this "problem" that had produced
an atmosphere ripe for Amendment 2: the enactment of antidiscrimination
laws based on sexual orientation in three large Colorado cities, 16 8 and an
executive order from the Governor promoting "'non-discrimination' in
hiring and promotion based on... 'sexual orientation. ' ,"169 In lieu of the
popularity of the statewide phenomena 70 of homosexual avocation, Scalia
164. Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Catherine J. Lanctot, The PlainMeaning of
Oncale, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 913, 941 (1999) (suggesting that lower-court attempts to
interpret Oncale are influenced by the conservatism of its author).
166. Romer 517 U.S. at 638-39, 645-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This "logic" assumes,
erroneously, that sexual orientation protection only extends to homosexuals, as opposed to being
a neutral term that extends to heterosexuals as well. Further, it grossly ignores the fact that
Amendment 2 of the Colorado constitution forbade not only homosexuals from participating in the
political process, but heterosexual advocates of gay antidiscrimination measures as well. See id. at
627.
167. Id. at 645-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Aspen Mun. Code § 13-98 (1977); Boulder Rev.
Mun. Code §§ 12-2-1 to 12-1-11 (1987); Denver Rev. Mun. Code, Art. IV, §§ 28-91 to 28-116
(1991)).
169. Romer, 517 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing COLO. EXEC. ORDER No. D0035
(Dec. 10, 1990)).
170. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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reasoned, Amendment 2 was "a modest attempt by . . . tolerant
Coloradoans to preserve traditional sexual mores." '
That "modest attempt" of Coloradoans can be analogized to those who
create a "hostile environment" in the workplace by victimizing on the
basis of sexual orientation. Like the Coloradoans, same-sex sexual
harassers also rebel against homosexual victims' nonconformity to
traditional sexual mores. 1" Though the comparison is not perfect, the same
underlying justification motivates both discriminatory actions. Justice
Scalia expressly approved ofthe former. How can Justice Scalia's opinion
in Oncale possibly be read to condone essentially the same
antidiscrimination efforts that he condemned, just two years earlier, as
"preferential treatment"' 7 3 ?
If the Supreme Court's historic treatment of homosexuals and Scalia's
disdain for their preferential rights 74 are too remote to shed light on the
inherent meaning of Oncale, the Court's subsequent vacation of the
Seventh Circuit's ruling in Doe v. City ofBelleville175 may provide more
proximate grounds for speculation. In Belleville, J. and H. Doe, sixteenyear old twins, were repeatedly harassed while working as lawnkeepers for
of Belleville. 76 H., who wore an earring, was called "fag" and
the City 177
"queer."' A coworker repeatedly threatened to "take him 'out to the
woods,"' and "get [him] up the ass.' 17' The verbal abuse turned physical
when the coworker, stating "I'm going to finally find out if you are a girl
or a guy," cornered H. against the wall, grabbed him179by his testicles, and
announced to the room, "[w]ell, I guess he's a guy.'
Though neither the twins nor the harassers were homosexual, the
district court found the discrimination motivated by the perceived
homosexuality of the plaintiffs and not "because of... sex." ' It reasoned
that because the harassers were heterosexual and had never sexually
propositioned the boys, the abuse was not motivated by sexual desire, but
by homophobia, a type of discrimination not covered by Title VII.'8 ' The
Seventh Circuit disagreed. Adopting an expansive reading of "because

171. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172. Leading feminist scholars have supported this view. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law,
Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187, 187.
173. Romer, 517 U.S. at 638.
174. Id.
175. 119 F.3d 563 (1997), vacatedby 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
176. Id. at 566.
177. Id. at 566-67.
178. Id. at 567 (second quotation marks omitted).
179. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
180. Id. at 567-68.
181. Id. at568.
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' the Court, in
of... sex" consistent with that of many feminist scholars, 82
a long and thorough opinion that included what the Supreme Court
ultimately would say in Oncale' 3 and more,'" found that ajudge hearing
a Title VII sex discrimination claim "cannot just declare that [the] case is
about sexual orientation, rather than sex," and thus not actionable, "simply
because homophobia has reared its head along with sexism."'8 5
Why would the Supreme Court vacate a ruling that was consistent with
its ruling in Oncale?Since the Court vacated Belleville without issuing an
opinion, its grounds remain unknown. 8 6 Perhaps Belleville anticipated the
Court's ruling in Oncale but went too far. Clearly the Seventh Circuit went
farther than the Supreme Court was willing to go in interpreting "because
of ... sex." Indeed, scholars have noted that certain aspects of Justice
Scalia's opinion in Oncale make it not only difficult, but impossible in a
vast number of cases for a plaintiff to establish a same-sex sexual
harassment claim.'87

B. Oncale's EvidentiaryRoutes: The "Restrictive
Expansion" of Title VII
Though the Supreme Court in Oncale advocated reading Title VII's
proscription of discrimination "because of ... sex" dynamically to "go
beyond the principal evil [it was intended to prohibit] to cover reasonably
comparable evils,"' 88 the opinion itself provided little ammunition for such
an application. Not only did the Court fail to settle the controversy that had
existed at the lower level, but its seemingly broad holding with restrictive
accompanying dicta, essentially exacerbated the confusion.
While the Court did expand the scope of those entitled to Title VII's
protection, it did so without expanding the reach of the traditional sexual

182. See id. at 570, 575. Indeed, the opinion quoted leading feminist scholars throughout,
relying on gender theory for much of the underlying rationale of the holding. See id. at 570.
183. Id. at 570 ("The Supreme Court, in interpreting [Title VIII has never indicated that
women alone may bring sexual harassment claims or that men may do so only when they are
harassed by women.").
184. The Court rejected the confining effect of the Supreme Court's comparative evidentiary
analysis: "Yet, we must question whether it is appropriate to view sexual harassment as actionable
sex discrimination only when the plaintiff is able to show that she was harassed because she was
a woman rather than a man, or vice versa." Id. at 577. The Court also found it unnecessary to
search for motivation behind the harassment: "Thus, so long as the environment itself is hostile to
the plaintiff because of her sex, why the harassment was perpetrated (sexual interest? misogyny?
personal vendetta? misguided humor? boredom?) is beside the point." Id. at 578 (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 594.
186. See City of Belleview v. Doe, 523 U.S. 1001, 1001 (1998) (stating only that case was
remanded to seventh circuit "for further consideration in light of" Oncale).
187. See Lanctot, supra note 165, at 913.
188. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
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harassment rule. Instead, the Court simply reiterated the rules from its two
precedent-setting sexual harassment cases-MeritorSavings Bank, and
Harris-assumingthe reasoning of those cases would extend by analogy
to victims of same-sex sexual harassment.'89 The Court relied on the two
traditional indicia of sexual harassment derived from those cases: 1)
whether the harasser made unwelcome sexual advances creating a hostile
work environment, 9 or 2) whether
the192harasser displayed general hostility
19
towards members of the same ' sex.
But by falling to distinguish that precedent from the facts at issue, the
Court failed to address the critical inquiry at the lower-court level: how
does the "because of... sex" analysis differ when the sexual harasser and
the victim are of the same sex? The conduct generally at issue in same-sex
sexual harassment claims suggests that harassers choose victims not
because of their biological sex, but because of their perceived
homosexuality. 93 As indicated by the majority of such claims, the
harassment is generally targeted at the victim as an individual, and not
others of the same sex.
Therefore, "[t]he critical issue," as reiterated by the Court, of "whether
members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions
of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed,"' 94 is
a difficult standard for the typical same-sex sexual harassment victim to
meet. It is especially difficult if the victim works in a unisex environment.
By making disparate treatment based upon the victim's biological sex
determinative as evidence of sex discrimination, the Court essentially
precluded any showing of discrimination imposed because of failure to
conform to the behaviors associated with sex, i.e., gender discrimination.
Therefore, the raw effect of the Supreme Court's recognition of same-sex
sexual harassment appears to sanction only one additional claim involving
sexual orientation: a Title VII action againstthe homosexual harasser who
targeted the victim because of his or her biological sex. One scholar notes
the hypocrisy ofthe distinction as "creat[ing] the absurd situation in which
courts are willing to hold gay men and lesbians liable for sexual
harassment, but will not allow them to recover when they are themselves
victimized by anti-gay workplace harassment."' 95
189. See generally id.
190. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
191. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
192. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78.
193. Though there was no such issue in the facts of Oncale,most cases at the lower level have
involved the plaintiff's homosexuality or perceived homosexuality. See, e.g., Smith v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326 (5th Cir. 1978).
194. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
195. Sandra Levitsky, Note, Footnote 55: Closingthe "Bisexual Defense" Loophole in Title
VII Sexual HarassmentCases, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1013, 1026 (1996).
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Since discrimination based upon sexual orientation is usually due, in
large part, to the harasser's refusal to accept the behaviors of those who
do not behave as members of their sex are expected to behave, it, like the
refusal to promote Ann Hopkins because of her failure to "act like a
woman," is discrimination based upon gender nonconformity.' 96 By
refusing to acknowledge the impact of Price Waterhouse's Title VII
protection for gender nonconformists on the conflict at hand, the Court
took more away from sex discrimination law than it gave.' 97 What has
been heralded as a dynamic reading of Title VII, therefore, was arguably
intended to preserve the traditional interpretation of the statute.
In simplifying the lower-court controversy, the Court essentially
ignored the controversy, leaving the courts to grapple with unanswered
questions: does Price Waterhouse apply to same-sex sexual harassment?
If so, does it equate sexual orientation discrimination with sex
discrimination? What relevance does the victim's homosexuality have on
the "because of... sex" analysis when the harasser is heterosexual? How
is a same-sex sexual harassment claim proven in a same-sex working
environment?
Justice Thomas, in a concurrence as informatively bereft as the
majority opinion, managed to capture the essence ofthe opinion in a single
line: "I concur because the Court stresses that in every sexual harassment
case, the plaintiff must plead and ultimately prove Title VII's
statutory
'198
requirement that there be discrimination 'because of... sex.
VI. CONCLUSION: READING ONCALE EXPANSIVELY

While few lower courts have been persuaded to apply the logic of Price
Waterhouse to the broad holding of Oncale and recognize sexual
harassment claims for victims discriminated against because of their
sexual orientation, such claims are not impossible to win. Courts must
recognize that while Oncale did not expressly sanction such claims, it also
did not prohibit them. The rationale of Price Waterhouse, combined with
the holding of Oncale, may provide sufficient protection for the victim of
sexual orientation discrimination.
The "evidentiary route challenge," as scholars have noted, is an
obstacle largely imposed by the lower courts.' 9 9 Despite the intent of
Oncale's author, the difficulty in proving same-sex sexual harassment
196. See Law, supra note 172, at 188-96.
197. While only the holding of the case represents binding law, lower courts continually rely
on the Court's dicta and still deny many same-sex sexual harassment claims. See supra cases cited
note 121.
198. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Like the majority, Justice Thomas added
nothing new to an old conflict.
199. See Lanctot, supra note 165, at 941.
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claims under the evidentiary routes outlined by the Court, and the many
questions left unanswered by Oncale, the bare holding of Oncale does
provide the Title VII protection that many courts were hesitant to
recognize before Oncale."' Courts should therefore use its broad holding,
and not the restrictive dicta, as guidance.2 ' Justice Scalia himself
admonished the Court to resist "the tendency to enshrine Supreme Court
dicta as law."20 2 Hence, in interpreting Oncale, it is important for courts to
observe that the evidentiary routes of Oncale were not intended to be
exhaustive. Via Price Waterhouse's reading of Title VII as protecting
those who fail to conform to gender stereotypes 3 and Oncale'sallowance
of such claims for males victimized by other males, 20 4 Supreme Court
precedent permits convincing legal arguments for homosexual victims of
same-sex sexual harassment.

200. See id.
201. See id. As noted by Lanctot, "[i]n ultimately applying a new Supreme Court opinion,
particularly one joined by all nine justices, it is the holding of the opinion that must guide the lower
courts, not the assorted examples, exhortations, and suggestions that accompany it." Id.
202. Id. (referring to Justice Scalia's opinion in St. Mary s Honor Ctr.v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
515 (1993), where Scalia warned against "dissect[ing] the sentences of the United States Reports
as though they were the United States Code" (alteration in original)).
203. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
204. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
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